ABSTRACT
Bail-outs by way of loan have a similar effect (on the debtor: plainly, the cost of delivering relief is allocated differently as between a bail-out and a bail-in) in that they enable the debtor to meet current fixed costs through borrowing, in effect swapping shorter-term liabilities with a longer-term liability. The authors acknowledge the support of the Oxford Law Faculty in funding the Conference "Corporate Restructuring Laws Under Stress" (St Hugh's College, Oxford, 10 October 2022) at which the papers in this special issue were first presented, and the support of the Covid-19 Research Response Fund at Oxford University, which provided funding for the wider project of which the Conference formed one part. Most authors, however, express some concerns in relation to Covid-19 bail-out design, and in particular query whether some bail-outs may have been too generous. [Extracted from the article] Copyright of European Business Organization Law Review is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)